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Leyla AteŞ* Cross-Border Tax Transparency: A Study
 of Recent Policy Developments in Turkey
Transnational tax information cooperation has the crucial role of empowering tax 
administrations to collect tax revenues in full and on time, thereby narrowing the 
tax gap created by international evasion and avoidance. However, the adequacy 
of established transnational tax information exchange systems in combatting 
international tax evasion and avoidance has been severely criticized and a new 
wave of progress on transparency has started after the 2008 global economic 
crisis. In this direction, Turkey set cross-border tax transparency high on its political 
agenda. Though, Turkey has operationalized new transnational tax cooperation 
agreements very slowly. Furthermore, Turkey’s approach to exchanging information 
has displayed important deficiencies. This article demonstrates the reasons for the 
Turkish government’s lack of urgency in making its cross-border tax affairs more 
transparent. It shows the ways in which cross-border tax transparency might be 
raised in the Turkish political agenda. The article concludes that the universal, 
rapid and consistent implementation of a coordinated response to cross-border tax 
evasion and avoidance through transparency efforts is bound by domestic public 
support and thus can only be obtained by the government in tandem with a popular 
mandate. 
La coopération transnationale en matière d’information fiscale a pour rôle crucial 
de donner aux administrations fiscales les moyens de percevoir les recettes 
fiscales dans leur intégralité et en temps voulu, réduisant ainsi le fossé créé par 
la fraude et l’évasion fiscales à l’échelle internationale. Cependant, l’adéquation 
des systèmes d’échange d’informations fiscales transnationaux établis pour lutter 
contre la fraude et l’évasion fiscales internationales a été sévèrement critiquée 
et une nouvelle vague de progrès en matière de transparence a débuté après 
la crise économique mondiale de 2008. Dans cette optique, la Turquie a fait de 
la transparence fiscale transfrontalière une priorité de son programme politique. 
Cependant, la Turquie a mis en œuvre très lentement les nouveaux accords de 
coopération fiscale transnationale. En outre, l’approche de la Turquie en matière 
d’échange d’informations présente d’importantes lacunes. Dans le présent article, 
nous démontrons les raisons du manque d’urgence du gouvernement turc à rendre 
ses affaires fiscales transfrontalières plus transparentes. Nous montrons comment 
la transparence fiscale transfrontalière pourrait être inscrite à l’agenda politique 
turc. L’article conclut que la mise en œuvre universelle, rapide et cohérente d’une 
réponse coordonnée à la fraude et à l’évasion fiscales transfrontalières par des 
efforts de transparence est liée au soutien de l’opinion publique nationale et ne 
peut donc être obtenue par le gouvernement qu’en tandem avec un mandat 
populaire. 
* Altinbas University Faculty of Law (leyla.ates@altinbas.edu.tr).










Under Turkish income taxation, based on the universality principle also 
implemented in many domestic tax law systems,1 resident taxpayers (tam 
mukellefler) are exposed to Turkish taxation on their worldwide income. 
This means taxpayers must inform the Turkish tax authority about 
domestic-sourced as well as foreign-sourced income earned during the 
fiscal year. However, the capacity of the tax administration to enforce the 
worldwide income taxation depends on its ability to obtain cross-border 
tax information.2 Although the Turkish tax administration, like many 
others, is legally entitled to access such data,3 to do so requires the reach of 
the tax administration to extend beyond national borders.4  
The Turkish tax administration may also need to access cross-border 
tax information involving non-resident taxpayers (dar	mukellefler) deriving 
income from sources within Turkey, based on the principle of territoriality. 
Even if Turkey takes no account of the foreign income of non-resident 
taxpayers, the Turkish tax administration may need to receive information 
from the jurisdiction of residency about relevant legal conditions in order 
to correctly implement tax laws.5 Thus, transnational tax cooperation has 
the crucial role of empowering tax administrations to collect tax revenues 
1. See Michael Lang, Introduction	 to	 the	 Law	 of	 Double	 Taxation	 Conventions (Wien: Linde 
Verlag, 2013) at 27. 
2. See Steven Dean, “The Incomplete Global Market for Tax Information” (2008) 49 Boston 
College L Rev 612 at 607; Miranda Stewart, “Transnational Tax Information Exchange Networks: 
Steps towards a Globalized, Legitimate Tax Administration” (2012) 4:2 World Tax J 152 at 152.
3. For several jurisdictions’ general legal framework on tax information collection including Turkey 
see Eleonor Kristoffersson et al, eds, Tax	Secrecy	and	Transparency:	The	Relevance	of	Confidentiality	
in	Tax	Law (Frankfurt & Main & PL Academic Research, 2013); Giuseppe Marino, ed, New	Exchange	
of	Information	versus	Tax	Solutions	of	Equivalent	Effect (Istanbul: IBFD, 2015).
4. Stewart, supra	note 2 at 152.
5. See Ana Paula Dourado, “Exchange of Information” in Ekkehart Reimer & Alexander Rust, eds, 
Klause	Vogel	on	Double	Taxation	Conventions, 4th ed (The Netherlands: Wolters Kluwer, 2015) at 
1859.
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in full and on time, thereby narrowing the tax gap created by international 
evasion and avoidance.6  
Double tax treaties have historically laid the legal basis for cross-border 
tax information exchange through articles pertaining to the exchange of 
information.7 In this regard, Turkey began to develop its transnational tax 
information network by signing its first double tax treaty with Austria 
in 1970.8 The initial expansion of the world’s tax treaty networks was 
gradual,9 and Turkey added only one more such agreement during this 
decade, followed by a further 11 in the 1980s.10 When transnational tax 
information networks expanded more rapidly after the 1990s,11 Turkey 
followed suit, signing an increased number of treaties, with the result 
that, as of 10 February 2021, there were 91 double tax treaties ratified 
in Turkey.12 However, the adequacy of established transnational tax 
information exchange systems in combatting international income tax 
evasion and avoidance has been severely criticized, especially after the 
2008 global economic crisis, widely seen as the catalyst for recent progress 
on transparency and cross-border tax information exchange.13
Turkey was among the countries most affected by the 2008 global 
economic crisis.14 Thus, it can be rightly assumed that at the London 
6. OECD, Tax	 Transparency	 2018:	 Report	 on	 Progress,	 Global	 Forum	 on	 Transparency	 and	
Exchange	of	 Information	 for	Tax	Purposes (2018), online (pdf): <www.oecd.org/tax/transparency/
global-forum-annual-report-2018.pdf> [perma.cc/3UZY-MGX3].
7. Stewart, supra note 2 at 159.
8. The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the United Nations 
(UN) have published treaty models that countries imitate when concluding bilateral tax conventions. 
Turkey mainly follows the OECD Model for its tax treaties, even if it deviates from it time to time in 
certain articles towards the UN Model Convention; Billur Yalti, “Turkey” in Yariv Brauner & Pasquale 
Pistone, eds, BRICS	and	The	Emergence	of	Internatıonal	Tax	Coordinaton (IBFD Online, 2015) at 
9.1.4. For the current version of both models see, OECD,	Model	Tax	Convention	on	Income	and	on	
Capital (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2017) [OECD Model]; UN, Model	Double	Taxation	Convention	
between	Developed	and	Developing	Countries (New York: United Nations, 2017). The agreement 
between Turkey and Austria came into force in 1974 so some Turkish scholars labelled that year as 
the start of international exchange of information mechanisms, see Cihat Oner, Uluslararasi	Alanda	
Vergi	Idareleri	Arası	Bilgi	Degisimi (Ankara: Yetkin, 2010) at 26. 
9. Stewart, supra note 2 at 159.
10. See Yalti, supra note 8 at 9.1.2.
11. Stewart, supra	note 2 at 159.
12. Turkey, Gelir Idaresi Baskanligi, “Yururlukte Bulunan Cifte Vergilendirmeyi Onleme 
Anlasmalari” (2019), online: <www.gib.gov.tr/sites/default/files/uluslararasi_mevzuat/
VERGIANLASMALIST.htm> [perma.cc/82VS-7TMD]; Turkiye Buyuk Millet Meclisi, Kanun Sorgu 
Sonuclari (2021), online: <www.tbmm.gov.tr/develop/owa/kanunlar_sd.sorgu_yonlendirme?Kanun_
no=&k_Baslangic_Tarihi=&k_Bitis_Tarihi=&r_Baslangic_Tarihi=&r_Bitis_Tarihi=&sorgu_kelime
=%E7ifte+vergilendirmeyi+%F6nleme>.
13. Pascal Saint-Amans, “Global tax and transparency: We have the tools, now we must make them 
work” OECD (2016), online: <www.oecd.org/tax/automatic-exchange/news/global-tax-transparency-
we-have-the-tools.htm> [perma.cc/M3XL-SGGK].
14. Hasan Comert & Esra Nur Ugurlu, “The Impacts of the 2008 Global Financial Crisis on 
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Summit on 2 April 2009, when the leaders of the Group of 20 (G20)15 
declared that “(t)he era of banking secrecy is over” and underscored 
the importance of inclusive international tax cooperation,16 Turkey—a 
member of the G20—set cross-border tax transparency high on its political 
agenda. In this direction, recent moves to increase the robustness of the 
OECD Article and Commentary pertaining to exchange of information17 
has been reflected in the signing of new treaties and alterations to some 
existing Turkish double tax treaties through protocols.18 Moreover, Turkey 
has signed five tax information exchange agreements since 201019 as 
well as the Multilateral Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance 
on 3 November 2011 (Multilateral	 Convention), instruments aiming to 
incorporate both tax haven jurisdictions and developing countries into 
transnational tax information networks.20
Despite signing numerous tax exchange agreements, Turkey has 
operationalized such agreements very slowly. There was an average interval 
of four years between the signing of tax information exchange agreements 
and their full ratification. For example, Parliamentary ratification of the 
Multilateral Convention took place on 3 May 2017,21 with the Council 
of Ministers’ ratification accompanied by reservations and declarations 
Developing Countries: The Case of the 15 Most Affected Countries” (2015) 15:19 ERC-Economic 
Research Center Working Paper 3, online (pdf): <erc.metu.edu.tr/en/system/files/menu/series15/1509.
pdf> [perma.cc/44HT-MQ43]; Ozlem Hic Birol, “The Effects of the Global Economic Crisis on 
Turkey’s Economy and the Recent Tilt in Her International Relations” (2011) 3:2 Intl J Business and 
Management Studies 227.
15. The G20 is an international network of 19 countries and the European Union. Those individual 
member countries other than Turkey are Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, 
India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Republic of Korea, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, the 
United Kingdom, and the United States, G20, “G20 Participants,” “About the G20,” online: <www.
g20.org/about-the-g20.html>. Regarding the emergence of the G20 as a tax policy forum in global 
economic crisis. See Allison Christians, “Taxation in a Time of Crisis: Policy Leadership from the 
OECD to the G-20” (2010) 5 Nw JL & Social Policy 19 at 19.
16. See OECD, G20	Leaders’	Declaration, London (2 April 2009) at para 15, online (pdf): <www.
oecd.org/g20/summits/london/G20-Action-Plan-Recovery-Reform.pdf> [perma.cc/B29G-GA5T]. 
17. For the latest updates to the exchange of information article of the OECD Model, see, OECD, 
Update	to	Article	26	of	the	OECD	Model	Tax	Convention	and	Its	Commentary (17 July 2012), online: 
<www.oecd.org/ctp/exchange-of-tax-information/120718_Article%2026-ENG_no%20cover%20
(2).pdf>. These updates to the exchange of information article were translated into the UN Model 
Convention as well.
18. Yaltı, supra note 8 at 9.2.6.1.
19. See Turkey, Gelir Idaresi Baskanligi, Yurulukte	 Bulunan	 Vergi	 Konularında	 Bilgi	 Degisim	
Anlasmalari (19 March 2018), online: <www.gib.gov.tr/uluslararasi_mevzuat>. 
20. Stewart, supra note 2 at 161, 163.
21. Vergi	 Konularında	 Karşılıklı	 İdari	 Yardımlaşma	 Sözleşmesinin	 Onaylanmasinin	 Uygun	
Bulunduğuna	 Dair	 Kanun	 [Mutual Administrative Assistance Agreement in Tax Matters] Law 
No 7018, Resmî Gazete [Official Gazette], 20 May 2017, No 30071, online: <resmigazete.gov.tr/
eskiler/2017/05/20170520-2.htm> [perma.cc/5G4R-CF9M].
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made on 30 October 2017.22 Eventually, the agreement came into effect 
at international level as of 1 July 2018, almost seven years after the initial 
signature in 2011.23 
Furthermore, Turkey’s approach to exchanging information has 
displayed important deficiencies which will be discussed in Part I of this 
article. Even the European Union (EU), by far Turkey’s largest trading 
partner,24 has grey-listed the country as a result of these deficiencies.25 
Since December 2017, the EU has classified countries as ‘black’ or 
‘grey’ in relation to26 the risk indicators of preferential regimes, zero or 
no corporate income tax and transparency and exchange of information.27 
The European Union’s executive body, the European Council (EC), takes 
tax and non-tax countermeasures against the blacklisted jurisdictions.28 
It moves grey-listed jurisdictions to the black list if they fail to make 
sufficient progress in addressing the highlighted areas of risk.29 In all three 
lists published to date, Turkey has been grey-listed owing to deficiencies 
in relation to requests for exchange of information and ineffective 
implementation of the automatic exchange of information. While the 
2020 list notes some developments in the area of automatic exchange of 
information, it emphasizes that Turkey will be relegated to the blacklist 
in subsequent updates if it fails to take the required actions.30 Considering 
22. Vergi	 Konularında	 Karşılıklı	 İdari	 Yardımlaşma	 Sözleşmesinin	 İlişik Çekince	 ve	 Beyanlarla	
Birlikte	 Onaylanması	 Hakkında	 Karar	 [Decision on the Approval of the Mutual Administrative 
Assistance Agreement in Tax Matters with the Related Reservations and Declarations] Law 
No 2017/10969, Resmî Gazete [Official Gazette], 26 November 2017, No 30252, online (pdf): 
<resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2017/11/20171126-12.pdf> [perma.cc/C7LS-3MG8].
23. See OECD, Jurisdictions	Participating	in	the	Convention	on	Mutual	Administrative	Assistance	
in	 Tax	 Matters	 Status (19 February 2020), online (pdf): <www.oecd.org/tax/exchange-of-tax-
information/Status_of_convention.pdf> [perma.cc/6JU5-AX6U]. 
24. European Commission, “Trade, Policy, Countries and regions: Turkey” (23 April 2020), online: 
<ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/turkey/> [perma.cc/WM4B-2U4Q].
25. See, European Commission, “Evolution of the EU list of Tax Havens” (18 February 2020), 
online (pdf): <ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/sites/taxation/files/eu_list_update_18_02_2020_
en.pdf> [perma.cc/RS7L-9UUK]. 
26. For the criticism of the listing approach, see Markus Meinzer, “Towards a Common Yardstick 
to Identify Tax Havens and to Facilitate Reform” in P Dietsch & Thomas Rixen, eds, Global	Tax	
Governance—What	 is	 Wrong	 with	 It,	 and	 How	 to	 Fix	 It (United Kingdom: ECPR Press, 2016); 
Wouter Lips & Alex Cobham, “Who will feature on the common EU blacklist of non- cooperative 
tax jurisdictions?” (2018), Open Data for Tax Justice; Irma  Johanna Mosquera Valderrama, “The EU 
Standard of Good Governance in Tax Matters for Third (Non-EU) Countries” (2019) 47 Intertax, 454 
at 464. 
27. Ana Paula Dourado & Petter Wattel, “Third States and External Tax Retations” in Peter Wattel, 
Otto Marres & Hein Vermeulen, eds, European	 Tax	 Law:	 General	 Topics	 and	 Direct	 Taxation	
(Deventer: Kluwer, 2018) at 214. 
28. Ibid.		
29. Ibid.
30. Council of the European Union, Council conclusions on the revised EU list of non-cooperative 
jurisdictions for tax purposes, 6129/20 (18 February 2020) at 4.
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the economic ties between Turkey and the EU, and the EC’s defensive 
measures against blacklisted jurisdictions, this will likely have important 
consequences for the Turkish economy.
In addition, the world is facing the unprecedented global health and 
economic crisis of COVID-19, which has led to an additional revenue 
gap in states’ coffers. In reassessing their medium-to-longer-term fiscal 
strategies as a result of the pandemic31, countries are likely to seek both 
new sources of revenue and the effective enforcement of existing tax laws. 
In view of the magnitude of transnational tax cooperation, incorporating 
47 million offshore accounts since 2018 and accounting for additional 
revenue of 95 billion Euros over the 2009-2019 period,32 cross-border tax 
cooperation is likely to become a focus of tax policy, as occurred in the 
aftermath of the 2008 economic crisis.33 
Thus, this article aims to detail the reasons for the Turkish 
government’s lack of urgency in making its cross-border tax affairs more 
transparent. To this end, Part II examines possible reasons for Turkey’s 
apparent reluctance to enforce the exchange of tax information. Part III 
analyzes the ways in which cross-border tax transparency might be raised 
in the Turkish political agenda. The article concludes that the universal, 
rapid and consistent implementation of a coordinated response to cross-
border tax evasion and avoidance through transparency efforts is bound by 
domestic public support and thus can only be obtained by the government 
in tandem with a popular mandate. To establish the will of the people, 
careful attention will need to be devoted to keeping accountability forums 
open.
I.	 Tracking	deficiencies	in	Turkish	cross-border	tax	transparency	policy	
The OECD has led transnational tax collaboration efforts since the 1960s.34 
In 2000, it formed the Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of 
Information for Tax Purposes (Global	Forum) as a multilateral framework 
31. Pascal Saint-Amans, “Tax in the time of COVID-19” The Forum Network (23 March 2020), 
online: <www.oecd-forum.org/users/369395-pascal-saint-amans/posts/63721-tax-in-the-time-of-
covid-19> [perma.cc/2RCN-5ZPS]. 
32. OECD, Implementation	of	tax	transparency	initiative	delivering	concrete	and	impressive	results 
(07 June 2019), online: <www.oecd.org/tax/automatic-exchange/news/implementation-of-tax-
transparency-initiative-delivering-concrete-and-impressive-results.htm> [perma.cc/58L8-GUDQ].
33. Civil society organizations have already started to create a discussion around this topic. See, 
The Financial Transparency Coalition, The Independent Commission for Reform of International 
Corporate Taxation, Oxfam and Public Services International, “Health versus Wealth?: Tax and 
Transparency in the Age of COVID-19” (12 May 2020), online: <financialtransparency.org/health-
versus-wealth-tax-transparency-age-covid-19/> [perma.cc/43BT-UM48].
34. Allison Christians, “Networks, Norms, and National Tax Policy” (2010) 9:1 Wash U Global 
Studies L Rev 14.
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for member and non-member countries to initiate and implement tax regimes 
of greater transparency and exchange information for tax purposes.35 
Since then, the Global Forum has developed two internationally agreed 
standards for tax purposes: the exchange of information on request (EOIR) 
and the automatic exchange of financial account information (AEOI). As 
an OECD country,36 Turkey is an original member of the Global Forum.37 
Thus, it is possible to track recent developments in Turkish cross-border 
tax transparency policy through the Global Forum’s monitoring and peer 
review activities for the implementation of the standards. 
1.	 The	EOIR	standard
The Global Forum has conducted peer reviews to assess its members’ 
adherence to the EOIR standard since 2010.38 Peer review is “an 
examination of one state’s performance or practices in a particular area 
by other states.”39 It is a cooperation tool and one of the key processes 
of the OECD.40 The aim of these peer reviews is to act as a disciplining 
measure to ensure that countries to effectively implement the standards41 
in order to advance their universal, rapid and consistent implementation. 42 
Peer reviews accomplish this goal by publicizing noncompliance with the 
reviewed standard and/or helping governments obtaining domestic public 
support for challenging policy changes.43 The Global Forum completed 
35. OECD, “About the Global Forum” (2018), online: <www.oecd.org/tax/transparency/about-the-
global-forum/> [perma.cc/YAK3-FF7X]. For the structural analysis of the Global Forum, see Allison 
Christians & Laurens van Apeldoorn, “The OECD Inclusive Framework” (2018) 72:4 Bulletin for 
International Taxation at 229-230. 
36. Although Turkey is a developing country, it is a founding member and its founding membership 
status in a rich man’s club is based on cold-war politics, see Leyla AteŞ, “Domestic Political Legitimacy 
of Tax Reform in Developing Countries: A Case Study of Turkey” (2012) 30:3 Wis Intl LJ 706 at 709.
37. The Global Forum included six non-member jurisdictions (Bermuda, Cayman Islands, Cyprus, 
Malta, Mauritius and San Marino) other than OECD countries in its establishment, OECD, Tax	Co-
operation	Towards	a	Level	Playing	Field:	2006	Assessment	by	the	Global	Forum	on	Taxation	(Paris: 
OECD Publishing, 2006) at 7. 
38. OECD, Launch	of	a	Peer	Review	Process:	Terms	of	Reference	to	Monitor	and	Review	Progress	
Towards	Transparency	and	Exchange	of	Information	for	Tax	Purposes	(2010), online (pdf): <www.
oecd.org/ctp/44824681.pdf> [perma.cc/TEX-MZZ5].
39. Peter Caroll & Aynsley Kellow, The	OECD:	A	Study	of	Organisational	Adaptation (Northampton: 
Edward Elgar, 2011) at 31.
40. Ibid;	 OECD,	 Peer	 Review:	 An	 OECD	 Tool	 for	 Co-operation	 and	 Change (Paris: OECD 
Publishing, 2003) [OECD Peer Review 2003].
41. OECD,	 Implementing	 the	 Tax	 Transparency	 Standards:	 A	 Handbook	 for	 Assessors	 and	
Jurisdictions, 2nd ed (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2011) at 7 [OECD Handbook 2011].
42. Ibid at 75.
43. Allison Christians & Laurens van Apeldoorn, “Tax Multilateralism via the OECD,” in Leyla 
AteŞ & Joachim Englisch, eds, The	Multilateral	Instrument	and	Its	Prospective	Effects	on	The	Turkish-
German	Double	Tax	Treaty (Istanbul: On Iki Levha, 2021). 
8 The Dalhousie Law Journal
the first round of EOIR reviews in 2016.44 A second round of reviews was 
scheduled between 2016 and 2020.45 
The reviews are biphasic: Phase 1 examines the jurisdiction’s legal 
and regulatory framework; Phase 2 looks into the implementation of this 
framework in practice. It was possible to combine the Phase 1 assessment 
and the Phase 2 assessment in the first round.46 In the second round 
of reviews, the phases were integrated for all jurisdictions.47 Turkey 
underwent a first combined round of reviews in 201348 and will undergo 
the second round in 2020.49 
The Global Forum carries out EOIR peer reviews based on three core 
documents.50 The first one is the “Terms of Reference.” It defines the 
standard and separates it into 31 sub-elements within 10 main elements 
for making assessment achievable. The second one is the “Methodology” 
that describes the review procedure in detail such as the time, manner, and 
place. The third document is the “Assessment Criteria” that establishes 
a rating system for assessing the implementation of the standard. Upon 
the completion of the peer review, the reviewed jurisdiction is assigned a 
rating for each main element, along with an overall rating. The rating might 
be compliant, largely compliant, partially compliant, or non-compliant.51 
Based on the transparency principle, the Global Forum makes individual 
jurisdictions’ reports and the overall ratings public via its web portal.52 
According to the 2013 reviews of Turkey, the overall rating for Turkey 
was partially compliant.53 Even though Turkey made two legislative 
amendments in the Tax Procedure Law (TPL) in order to improve its 
legislative framework during the peer review process,54 the overall ratings 
were not upgraded. 
44. OECD, Exchange	of	 Information	on	Request	Handbook	 for	Peer	Reviews	2016–2020 (Paris: 
OECD Publishing, 2016) at 5 [OECD Handbook 2016].
45. Ibid.
46. OECD Handbook 2011, supra note 41 at 13. 
47. OECD Handbook 2016, supra note 44 at 27.
48. OECD, Global	Forum	on	Transparency	and	Exchange	of	Information	for	Tax	Purposes	Peer	
Reviews:	 Turkey	 2013:	 Combined:	 Phase	 1	 +	 Phase	 2 (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2013); OECD, 
Global	Forum	on	Transparency	and	Exchange	of	Information	for	Tax	Purposes	Peer	Reviews:	Turkey	
2013:	Combined:	Phase	1	+	Phase	2,	incorporating	Phase	2	ratings (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2013) 
[OECD Peer Review of Turkey].
49. Global Forum, Exchange of Information on Request: Schedule of Reviews 2016-2023 (2016) 
at 2, online (pdf): <www.oecd.org/tax/transparency/about-the-global-forum/publications/schedule-of-
reviews.pdf> [perma.cc/QK2J-6H5B].
50. OECD Handbook 2011, supra note 41 at 19-20; OECD Handbook 2016, supra note 44 at 11-12.
51. OECD Handbook 2011, supra note 41 at 80; OECD Handbook 2016, supra note 44 at 81.
52. OECD Handbook 2011, supra note 41 at 57; OECD Handbook 2016, supra note 44 at 54.
53. OECD Peer Review of Turkey, supra note 48 at 9.
54. Turkey established a clear legal mechanism to obtain information for exchange of information 
purposes by adding article 152/A and made an amendment regarding the scope of professional 
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Since the beginning of the second round of peer reviews in 2016, 
several jurisdictions have made changes in their implementation that 
improved their overall ratings.55 Currently, Turkey has been among the 
few countries classified as partially compliant.56 In fact, in response to 
the peer recommendation on one partially compliant element,57 another 
Turkish regulatory amendment, which limits the time permitted to respond 
to requests from other jurisdictions for tax information, came into force in 
2015.58 However, it is not possible to evaluate the practical implementation 
of this amendment before the second round of peer reviews. Nevertheless, 
on another element of non-compliance, that of identifying owners of 
bearer shares in all instances, no action has yet been taken.59 
2.	 The	AEOI	standard
The AEOI standard has not been subject to peer review previous, but review 
is scheduled to begin in 2020.60 Nonetheless, the Global Forum monitors 
the jurisdiction’s commitment to implement the standard61 and publishes 
the results each year in a report.62 The Forum takes stock of the exchange of 
information on financial accounts and assets, known in OECD terminology 
as common reporting standard (CRS) information.63 According to the 2019 
privilege in tax matters in Article 151/3 (OG: 11 June 2013; 28674).
55. OECD, Brief	on	the	State	of	Play	on	the	international	tax	transparency	standards (September 
2017) at 2, online (pdf): <www.oecd.org/tax/transparency/brief-and-FAQ-on-progress-on-tax-
transparency.pdf> [perma.cc/9ESW-8BB5].
56. OECD, Overall	 rating	 following	 peer	 reviews	 against	 the	 standard	 of	EOIR (6 April 2020), 
online: <www.oecd.org/tax/transparency/exchange-of-information-on-request/ratings/> [perma.
cc/2RZZ-95ZV].  
57. OECD Peer Review of Turkey, supra note 48 at 112.
58. Vergi	İncelemelerinde	Uyulacak	Usul	ve	Esaslar	Hakkında	Yönetmelikte	Değişiklik	Yapılmasına	
Dair	 Yönetmelik	 [Regulation Amending the Regulation on the Procedures and Principles to be 
Followed in Tax Inspections], Resmî Gazete [Official Gazette], 06 November 2015, No 29524, online: 
<resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2015/11/20151106-5.htm> [perma.cc/ME8D-SSZS].
59. Tax Justice Network, Financial Secrecy Index 2020: Turkey (2020) at ID172, online: <fsi.
taxjustice.net/database/dbr_Jurisdiction.php?Juris=TR&Per=20> [perma.cc/34KV-B59E]. 
60. OECD, Automatic	 Exchange	 Portal:	 Commitment	 and	 Monitoring	 Process (2020), online: 
<www.oecd.org/tax/automatic-exchange/commitment-and-monitoring-process/> [perma.cc/S524-
YQRJ].
61. OECD, Automatic	 Exchange	 of	 Information	 (AEOI):	 Status	 of	 Commitments (May 2020), 
online (pdf): <www.oecd.org/tax/automatic-exchange/commitment-and-monitoring-process/AEOI-
commitments.pdf> [perma.cc/B9J8-Y6R7]. 
62. See OECD, Automatic	Exchange	of	 Information	Implementation	Report (2017), online (pdf): 
<www.oecd.org/tax/transparency/reporting-on-the-implementation-of-the-AEOI-standard.pdf> 
[perma.cc/Q3KW-K3VX]; OECD, Automatic	 Exchange	 of	 Information	 Implementation	 Report	
(2018), online (pdf): <www.oecd.org/tax/transparency/AEOI-Implementation-Report-2018.pdf> 
[perma.cc/TM6H-FKJ3]; OECD, Automatic	Exchange	of	Information	Implementation	Report (2019), 
online (pdf): <www.oecd.org/tax/transparency/AEOI-implementation-report-2019.pdf> [perma.
cc/9PYN-BMXZ] [OECD 2019 AEOI Implementation Report].
63. OECD, Activated	Exchange	Relationships	for	CRS	Information	(February 2020), online: <www.
oecd.org/tax/automatic-exchange/international-framework-for-the-crs/exchange-relationships/> 
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AEOI Report, Turkey exchanged financial account information with only 
1 partner jurisdiction in 2018 and 2 partner jurisdictions in 2019.64 These 
numbers are clearly much lower than the other 95 listed jurisdictions in the 
report, which averaged 51 exchanges in 2018 and 60 in 2019.65 
For cross-border automatic exchange of CRS information, a jurisdiction 
must first translate the reporting and due diligence procedure into domestic 
law. Then, the jurisdiction has to select an international legal basis for the 
automatic exchange of this information with other jurisdictions. In addition 
to the legal basis, another international agreement, namely, the Competent 
Authority Agreement (CAA), is required to determine the details of the 
information to be exchanged, as well as the manner and time this would 
occur. There are two principal types of CAA. The first type is based on the 
principles of bilateralism and reciprocity. The second one is a multilateral 
agreement that eludes the need to sign several bilateral agreements. 
As summarized in the Introduction of this article, Turkey has several 
legal bases in force to facilitate cross-border information exchange, 
including those based on the AEOI standards.66 For CAA, Turkey first 
signed the Multilateral Competent Authority Agreement on the Automatic 
Exchange of Financial Account Information (Multilateral CAA) on 21 
April 2017, but didn’t ratify it expeditiously.67 Meanwhile, Turkey entered 
into bilateral CAAs with Latvia and Norway, on 20 and 21 December 
2018 respectively.68 Thus, for 2018 and 2019, Turkey was able to activate 
[perma.cc/CV3Y-A7MZ].
64. OECD 2019 AEOI Implementation Report, supra note 62 at 5. 
65. See ibid at 3-5. 
66. However, since Turkish tax information exchange agreements modeled the OECD’s 2002 model, 
which provides for information exchange only upon request unless the parties did stipulate otherwise, 
preferring to include automatic information, the current five Turkish tax information exchange 
agreements can’t be a legal basis for the automatic exchange of CRS information, Leyla Ates, “Legal 
Bases and Key Issues of Turkish-German Automatic Exchange of Information: Implementing the 
Standard in Turkey” in Leyla Ates & Joachim Englisch, eds, Automatic	Exchange	of	Information	and	
Prospects	of	Turkish-German	Cooperation (Istanbul: On İki Levha, 2018) at 156.
67. News IBFD, “OECD—Multilateral Competent Authority Agreement on automatic exchange of 
information—signed by Turkey” (11 May 2017). 
68. Agreement between the Competent Authorities of the Republic of Turkey and the Republic 
of Latvia on the Automatic Exchange of Financial Account Information to Improve International 
Tax Compliance; Agreement between the Competent Authorities of the Kingdom of Norway and 
the Republic of Turkey on the Automatic Exchange of Financial Account Information to Improve 
International Tax Compliance (OG: 30 December 2018, 30641). The shift in Turkey’s political 
reference from multilateral towards bilateral agreements does not refer a clear logic since both 
jurisdictions are also signatories of the Multilateral Convention. As a matter of fact, Turkey does not 
have strong economic relations in terms of foreign direct and portfolio investment either with Latvia or 
Norway. When we look at the other treaty partners activated relationship numbers, we see that Latvia 
has an active relationship with 97 countries and Norway has an active relationship with 96 countries. 
Thus, we might come to this conclusion: this progress is not a result of the Turkish government but 
Latvian and Norwagian governmental efforts. 
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exchange relationships for CRS information with only these two countries. 
Following the ratification of the Multilateral CAA on 31 December 201969 
and notification of the prospective partner(s), Turkey finally activated 
exchange relationships for CRS information with 55 jurisdictions at the 
beginning of 2020.70 
However, in the author’s opinion, there is another deficiency 
that eluded the peer reviewers. In order to translate financial account 
information collection and reporting obligations into domestic law for 
the purposes of the AEOI, the Turkish Parliament passed Law 7061 of 28 
November 2017 that amended Article 257 bis of the TPL.71 Nonetheless, 
the amendment only introduced an empowering provision to the Ministry 
of Finance to regulate the automatic reporting standard by issuing a 
General Communiqué on the TPL. Since then there has been no published 
regulation. Considering that the OECD asks for the primary legislation 
to be included in the scope of the obligations (i.e. due diligence and the 
reporting requirements),72 the amended provision does not fulfill the 
prerequisite for domestic translation.73 As a matter of fact, the peer reviews 
conducted for the country-by-country reporting (CbC) standard under 
the OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) Project found 
Turkey’s domestic legal framework unable to automatically change CbC 
information. This was despite the Turkish Parliament passing another law, 
Law 6728 of 15 July 2016, which amended Article 13 of the Corporate 
Income Tax Law empowering the President to regulate the scope of CbC 
reporting obligations.74
II.	 Possible	rationales	on	reluctant	policy	
The examination of recent developments in Turkish transnational tax 
cooperation as it pertains to exchange of information displays Turkey’s 
reluctance to implement greater transparency in cross-border taxation. 
69. Presidential Decree on the Approval of the Multilateral Competent Authority Agreement on 
the Automatic Exchange of Financial Account Information No. 2019/1965 (OG: 31 December 2019; 
30995 [5 bis.]). 
70. OECD, Activated	Exchange	Relationships	for	CRS	Information	(February 2020), online: <www.
oecd.org/tax/automatic-exchange/international-framework-for-the-crs/exchange-relationships/> 
[perma.cc/9T2U-FPT2].
71. Law 7061 on the Amendment of Some Laws (OG: 5 December 2017, 30261). 
72. OECD, Standard	 for	 Automatic	 Exchange	 of	 Financial	 Information	 in	 Tax	 Matters:	
Implementation	Handbook, 2nd ed (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2018) at 14.
73. Ates, supra note 66 at 147.
74. OECD, Country-by-Country	 Reporting—Compilation	 of	 Peer	 Review	 Reports	 (Phase	 1):	
Inclusive	 Framework	 on	 BEPS:	 Action	 13,	 OECD/G20	 Base	 Erosion	 and	 Profit	 Shifting	 Project 
(Paris: OECD Publishing, 2018) at 711; OECD, Country-by-Country	Reporting—Compilation	of	Peer	
Review	Reports	(Phase	2):	Inclusive	Framework	on	BEPS:	Action	13,	OECD/G20	Base	Erosion	and	
Profit	Shifting	Project (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2019) at 523. 
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The country has taken the required steps slowly at both the national and 
international levels. When Turkey underwent its EOIR process in 2013, 
reviewers flagged the period between the signature of an exchange of 
information agreement and the entry into force that took 24 months in many 
cases as too long. However, as shown above, the rate at which Turkey has 
enforced international tax treaties and implemented recommendations has 
slowed down, not accelerated. The period of time between the signature 
of the Multilateral Convention and its entry into force was 80 months. It 
subsequently took 31 months to ratify the Multilateral CAA for automatic 
exchange of financial account information. Furthermore, Turkey has 
not yet signed the Multilateral Competent Authority Agreement on 
the Exchange of Country-By-Country Reports that facilitate another 
transparency instrument, i.e. CbC reporting, in contrast to 84 countries 
which are now signatories of the agreement.75 Moreover, Turkey has not 
fully met the domestic translation requirements for the exchange of CRS 
information and also CbC reporting.
An official Ministry of Finance press release, dated 10 January 
2018, offers some clues about a possible rationale for the delay in the 
implementation of the AEOI standard.76 The press release sought to alleviate 
the concerns of the millions of Turkish citizens residing in and receiving 
welfare payments from EU countries such as Germany.77 According to 
several statements from the Turkish-German community, many Turkish 
immigrants will be affected by activated exchange relationships on 
CRS information. When the exchange relationship on CRS information 
activated, many Turkish citizens residing in Germany will be disqualified 
from receiving welfare payments due to their undeclared income.78 For 
instance, Germany would both cut the social security support of those 
affected and seek to recover previous payments, on which interest would 
be charged. Furthermore, the German tax administration would reassess 
75. For the current parties of the Multilateral Competent Authority Agreement see OECD, 
“Signatories of the Multilateral Competent Authority Agreement on the Exchange of Country-By-
Country Reports (Cbc MCAA) and Signing Dates” (22 December 2019), online (pdf): <https://www.
oecd.org/ctp/exchange-of-tax-information/CbC-MCAA-Signatories.pdf> [perma.cc/R38E-X3PX]. 
76. Hazine ve Maliye Bakanligi, “Agbal, ‘Otomatik Bilgi Degisimi’ Tartismalarina Aciklik Getirdi” 
(10 January 2018), online: <www.hmb.gov.tr/haberler/agbal-otomatik-bilgi-degisimi-tartismalarina-
aciklik-getirdi> [perma.cc/N3M6-HG5K].
77. Sputnik, “Turkiye’de parasi bulunan gurbetciye yapilan yardim kesilecek (3 January 2018) at 
para 3, online: <https://tr.sputniknews.com/turkiye/201801031031658409-turk-gurbetci-almanya-
yardim-ceza/> [perma.cc/QPW5-TKXF]; Regina T. Riphahn, Monica Sander & Christoph Wunder, 
“The Welfare Use of Immigrants and Natives in Germany: The Case of Turkish Immigrants” 
(November 2010) at 1, online (pdf): <www.laser.uni-erlangen.de/papers/upload/117.pdf> [perma.
cc/7GG4-4U6A].
78. Sputnik, ibid at para 1.
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the tax liabilities of these people and impose tax evasion penalties for 
undeclared income. While the Minister of Finance also stated that Turkey 
would finalize legal, administrative and technical frameworks by the end 
of 2019, the implementation delays clearly aimed to provide secrecy to 
Turkish immigrants. 
This approach is problematic in two aspects. First, it clearly undermines 
commitment to transnational tax cooperation. Second, it overlooks the 
fact that the AEOI standard helps countries to narrow down the tax gap 
in their jurisdictions created by international evasion. In other words, the 
AEOI standard was created to divert revenues from private individuals or 
corporations to the treasuries of states. As a matter of fact, a number of 
well-publicized leaks of tax data have identified the offshore holdings of 
wealthy Turkish resident individual and corporate taxpayers, implicating 
various Turkish politicians and public officials.79 For example, they 
revealed links between offshore entities and the families or close friends 
of the Turkish Presidents, Prime Minister and the mayor of Istanbul based 
on the Panama and Paradise Papers.80 They illuminated an offshore tax 
avoidance scheme via Malta and Sweden that the Turkish President’s son-
in-law created in an attempt to repatriate his Dubai company’s profits to 
Turkey tax free, and the offshore wealth of the Turkish Prime Minister’s 
family is estimated at least 140 million USD based on the Malta Files.81 
However, unlike in many other countries,82 this leaked data has not 
spurred the Turkish government to prosecute taxpayers, sanction tax 
advisors, or make additional tax assessments. From the deficiencies 
determined in Part I.2, it is also apparent that these leaks have not induced 
the expeditious enactment of new laws or stimulated further agreements 
79. See The International Consortium of Investigative Journalists, “Swiss Leaks; Turkey” (2015), 
online: <https://projects.icij.org/swiss-leaks/countries/tur> [perma.cc/C6TR-65CF] (revealed more 
than 3.000 account information associated with Turkey from the HSBC via its Swiss subsidiary); The 
International Consortium of Investigative Journalists, “Offshore Leaks Database: Browse by country 
Turkey” (2016), online: <offshoreleaks.icij.org/search?c=TUR&cat=1> [perma.cc/5K94-LKV2]
(revealed 105 offshore entities associated with Turkey from several sources including the Panamanian 
law firm Mossack Fonseca and the legal firm Appleby).
80. Pelin Unker, “Cengiz’in Turkiye’deki Gizli Sirketi Panama’da Cikti” in Cumhuriyet (2 July 
2016); Pelin Unker, “Panama Belgeleri: Elhamdulillah off-shore’cuyum” in Cumhuriyet (7 July 
2016); Pelin Unker, “#ParadisePapaers: Off-shore biraderler” in Cumhuriyet (7 November 2017); 
Pelin Unker, “Milyon Dolarlik Ihale Basbakan’in Ogluna” in Cumhuriyet (8 November 2017).
81. Craig Shaw & Zeynep Sentek, “Family business of Turkey Prime Minister heads offshore” (24 
May 2017), online: <theblacksea.eu/stories/malta-files/family-business-of-turkey-prime-minister-
heads-offshore/> [perma.cc/J6V4-5DQB]; Craig Shaw & Zeynep Sentek, “Turkish President 
Erdogan’s son-in-law in off-shore tax scheme” (19 May 2017), online: <theblacksea.eu/stories/malta-
files/turkish-president-erdogans-son-in-law-in-off-shore-tax-scheme/> perma.cc/B6AM-MYQM].
82. See Shu-Yi Oei & Diane M. Ring. “Leak-Driven Law” (2018) 65:3 UCLA L Rev, 532 at 536-
537, 560-561.
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to create greater cross-border tax transparency. The next part outlines how 
cross-border tax transparency may be promoted up the Turkish political 
agenda by considering a past tax scandal that attracted policy attention and 
raised public awareness.
III.	 Raising	cross-border	tax	transparency	up	the	agenda
Before the recent wave of international tax scandals, Turkey become 
party to a cross-border tax scandal that erupted in 2000. It revealed that 
several Turkish immigrants invested their savings in Turkey with the help 
of the German Dresdner Bank but apparently didn’t declare their interest 
revenues to the German tax authorities. 
The background to this story is as follows: in the 1960s, Turkey 
introduced a scheme to address the deteriorating external imbalance that 
it had endured for a number of years.83 This “Dresdner Bank Scheme” 
was based on a money transfer agreement between Dresdner Bank and the 
Turkish Central Bank that permitted savings accounts to be opened at the 
Turkish Central Bank through the agency of Dresdner Bank.84 The latter 
collected private deposits of Turkish citizens living abroad and forwarded 
them to the Turkish Central Bank in exchange for a commission.85 In the 
beginning of 1975, the scheme was expanded to any non-resident who 
wanted to benefit from it.86 Since the Central Bank of Turkey offered higher 
interest rates than those available on the European market, it attracted a 
high volume of savings.87
In 1999, the German tax auditors inspected a Turkish citizen 
resident in Germany and identified undeclared interest income from his 
holdings.88 The taxpayer then revealed the agreement between Turkish 
Central Bank and Dresdner Bank AG to the Frankfurt public prosecutor’s 
office.89 In 2000, the German tax auditors raided the liaison offices of 
the Turkish Central Bank in Frankfurt and Berlin, and the head office of 
Dresdner Bank AG under a search warrant to determine account owners.90 
Afterwards, the local tax offices started to send additional tax assessment 
and tax penalty notices to the related taxpayers.91 This was alarming since 
83. Richard Barth & William Hemphill, Financial	Programming	and	Policy:	The	Case	of	Turkey 
(Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, 2000) at 6, 387.
84. Ibid.	
85. Turkiye Buyuk Millet Meclisi (TBMM) Tutanak Dergisi, 21. Donem 71:4 (11 October 2001) 
364-516, at 428.
86. Bart & Hemphill, supra note 83 at 6.
87. Ibid at 6, 414; TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, supra note 85 at 430-431.
88. TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, supra note 85 at 432.
89. Ibid.
90. Ibid.
91. Ibid	at 432, 438. 
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a large number of these taxpayers were welfare recipients, meaning they 
would also later be investigated for social security deception. 92
This scandal was brought to the attention of the Turkish public via 
two channels: press and parliamentary oversight. Turkish newspapers 
first reported the raids to the liaison offices of the Turkish Central Bank, 
highlighting the possibility of tax inspections against accounts holders 
from the Bank.93 Later on, the European edition of a Turkish newspaper 
published in Frankfurt revealed the presence of 7,000 tax evasion 
investigation files at the Frankfurt Prosecution Office and a deal between 
Darmstadt Tax Office and the Turkish Central Bank that supposedly would 
allow the total amount of associated tax fines to be collected from the 
Bank.94 The Turkish Central Bank then sent a disclaimer to the newspaper, 
denying the existence of any such deal.95 When parliamentary attention was 
drawn to the matter, an MP from the coalition of ruling parties submitted 
a written question to the presidency of Turkish Grand National Assembly 
to be referred to the Minister of State on 17 July 2001.96 The presidency 
forwarded the question on 25 September 2001 and the Minister responded 
to it on 11 October 2001.97 The response detailed the agreement between 
the Turkish Central Bank and Dresdner Bank and strongly underlined 
that the responsibility to declare income rested on the taxpayers and the 
Turkish Central Bank was not liable for the undeclared interest income of 
account holders.98 
Neither the Turkish press nor parliamentarians took this scandal as a 
transparency and transnational tax cooperation issue. Apparently, the base 
erosion of German tax revenue was not an issue of concern for Turkey. 
As a matter of fact, Turkey and Germany signed their first income tax 
treaty in 1985. (It came into force on 30 December 1989.99) In accordance 
92. Sukru Kizilot & Mustafa Durmus, “Kriz Donemince Vergi Politikasi Nasil Olmalı?” (2001) 2 
Gazi Universitesi İ.İ.B.F. Dergisi 159 at 172.
93. Hurriyet, “Almanya’da Turk Merkez Bankasi’na polis baskini” (9 July 2000), online: <www.
hurriyet.com.tr/ekonomi/almanyada-turk-merkez-bankasina-polis-baskini-39166880>; Erkan 
Mumcu, “Dresdner hesabi, Merkez Bankasi’ni yıpratıyor” (23 July 2000) in Hurriyet, online: <www.
hurriyet.com.tr/ercan-kumcu-dresdner-hesabi-merkez-bankasini-yipratiyor-39170089>; Gungor 
Uras, “Almancilerin Merkez Bankasi’ndaki mevduati 10.5 milyar dolar” (11 July 2000), online: 
<www.milliyet.com.tr/yazarlar/gungor-uras/almancilarin-merkez-bankasindaki-mevduati-10-5-
milyar-dolar-5312444>. 
94. TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, supra note 85 at 437.
95. Ibid.
96. Ibid at 419-420.
97. Ibid	at 420.
98. Ibid at 420-438.
99. OG: 9 July 1986, 19159. It was repealed and another income tax treaty was signed between the 
parties in 2011 (OG: 24 January 2012, 28183). 
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with the treaty models,100 Article 25 of the Treaty included an exchange of 
information. Thus, these responses neglected the fundamental obligation 
of exchange of information. Still, they informed the public about the 
Dresdner Bank scheme and how it was used by the Turkish government as 
a tool of foreign borrowing, and by Turkish citizens resident abroad as a 
tool of tax evasion. In this regard, the past scandal showed the importance 
of press and parliamentary oversight in creating public awareness of 
tax-related issues. It also offers insights into the recent reluctance of the 
Turkish government to improve cross-border tax transparency and in turn, 
the ways in which transparency can rise in the Turkish public agenda, 
since the influence of both forums (press and parliamentary scrutiny) has 
declined in Turkey, particularly since 2013.101 
Freedom of the press is a constitutionally protected right in Turkey. 
Article 28 of the 1982 Constitution sets that “(t)he press is free, and shall 
not be censored” and requires the State “(to) take the necessary measures 
to ensure freedom of the press and information.”102 However, severe 
obstruction of press freedom has been noted, with internet censorship, 
intimidation, attacks and murders perpetrated against journalists, civil 
defamation cases, media pluralism, and ownership structures, among other 
examples.103 While some progress has occurred since 2011, Article 28 has 
been contravened on numerous occasions since corruption investigations 
were launched against the highest levels of the government on 17 December 
2013.104 Among other examples, Pelin Unker, a journalist who reported 
on the Panama and Paradise Papers in 2016 and 2017105 was sued by 
politicians and their close family members for defamation in the criminal 
and civil courts.106 In both cases, she was sentenced to imprisonment, 
100. See supra	note 17. 
101. Kemal Kirisci & Amanda Sloat, “The rise and fall of liberal democracy in Turkey: Implications 
for the West” (2019), online (pdf): <www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/FP_20190226_
turkey_kirisci_sloat.pdf> [perma.cc/RU25-TEL5].
102. For the full English text of the 1982 Turkish Constitution in English, see Department of Laws 
and Resolutions, Constitution	of	the	Republic	of	Turkey (Ankara: GNAT Printing House, 2019).
103. Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, “Memorandum on freedom of expression 
and media freedom in Turkey” (15 February 2017) at 2, online: <rm.coe.int/ref/CommDH(2017)5>. 
104.  Ibid at 9; Freedom House Special Report, “Democracy in Crisis: Corruption, Media, and Power 
in Turkey” (3 February 2014) at 1, online (pdf): <freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/2020-02/SR_
Corruption_Media_Power_Turkey_PDF.pdf> [perma.cc/2QN7-BBPE].
105. See supra note 80.
106. Some countries treat defamation only as a civil wrong, others treat defamation as a criminal 
act as well as civil wrong. Turkey is among the latter category. Since criminal sanctions may create 
a chilling effect on the media, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe reviews 
the legal systems of several countries in this regard. As stated in its 2017 version, Turkey is a 
highly problematic jurisdiction with the extraordinary use of criminal law to punish defamation, 
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, “Defamation and Insult Laws in the OSCE 
Region: A Comparative Study” (March 2017) at 32-33, online (pdf): <https://www.osce.org/files/f/
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but the prison sentences were overturned on appeal due to a statute of 
limitations.107 Nevertheless, she was ordered to pay compensation by civil 
courts.108 Pelin Unker remains the first and only journalist to investigate 
the recent international tax scandals inside Turkey. 
Meanwhile, the President has increased his power to the detriment of 
Parliament as well as other government branches and state agencies.109 
The 2017 Constitutional Amendments ended the parliamentary system of 
government that had existed since the Ottoman era110 and introduced a 
presidential form of government without strong checks and balances.111 
In parallel, the number of parliamentary oversight tools decreased. For 
example, parliamentarians can no longer use interpellation as a means 
of parliamentary oversight.112 Although it was rarely used throughout 
parliamentary history,113 interpellation is a powerful oversight mechanism 
since it enabled Parliament to vote the cabinet or its individual members out 
of office.114 Its loss is a noteworthy sign of the weakening of Parliamentary 
authority,115 although the effectiveness of the remaining means of 
parliamentary oversight have also declined in recent years. For example, 
after the Panama Papers mentioned not the name but the number of offshore 
holdings of Turkish residents at that time, an MP from the opposition party 
referred a question to the Minister of Finance on 5 April 2016 about what 
would be the government’s response and whether the government would 
prosecute taxpayers or make additional tax assessments.116 The 18 July 
2016 response was vague and did not invoke Turkey’s tax treaty network 
documents/b/8/303181.pdf>.
107. Expression Inter-rupt-ed!, “Who is tried: Pelin Unker” (2019), online: <www.
expressioninterrupted.com/page.php?url=pelin-unker> [perma.cc/3FSW-8KBB]. 
108. Ibid.
109. Orcun Selcuk, “Strong presidents and weak institutions: populism in Turkey, Venezuela and 
Ecuador” (2016) 16:4 Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 571-589, at 584.
110. Ergun Ozbudun, The	Constitutional	System	of	Turkey:	1876	to	the	Present (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2011) at 3.
111. Selcuk,	supra note 109 at 584.
112. See 1982 Turkish Constitution, Article 98. Other oversight mechanisms include oral questions, 
parliamentary investigations and inquiries remain. 
113. See Ozbudun, supra note 110 at 67.
114. Ibid.
115. European Commission for Democracy Through Law (Venice Commission), “Turkey: Opinion 
on the Amendments to the Constitution Adopted by the Grand National Assembly on 21 January 2017 
and to be Submitted to a National Referendum On 16 April 2017” (13 March 2017) at 12, online (pdf): 
<https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=cdl-ad(2017)005-e> [perma.
cc/2DQ8-HL58]. 
116. Yurdagul Simsek “Turkiye, Panama Belgelerini edinmek icin girisimde bulunacak mi?” (5 April 
2016), online: <tr.sputniknews.com/turkiye/201604051021962512-panama-belgeleri-turkiye-tbmm/> 
[perma.cc/B258-AWU4]. 
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as a means of receiving information.117 Moreover, when an offshore tax 
leak occurred domestically in 2017,118 a group of opposition parliamentary 
members also demanded a parliamentary investigation as another way of 
parliamentary oversight. However, it couldn’t be initiated as a result of 
insufficient number of votes.119
Consequently, the lack of strong parliamentary oversight and 
restrictions on media freedom hinders the creation of domestic support 
for cross-border tax transparency in Turkey. This finding is particularly 
important considering that the OECD mainly focuses on governmental 
efforts to create transparency.120
Conclusion
The effectiveness of transnational cooperation efforts in the field 
of tax transparency needs to ensure universal, rapid and consistent 
implementation of the coordinated response to cross-border tax evasion 
and avoidance. In this regard, the Global Forum’s monitoring and peer 
review activities help governments to obtain domestic public support 
for challenging policy reforms. As a matter of fact, when we look at 
the recent Turkish policy developments in the area of cross border tax 
transparency, the transformative impact of the OECD Global Forum can 
be observed. However, the slow pace of these developments also reveals 
that the effective implementation of transparency standards depends 
not only on governments to win support at home, but also the people of 
the country to create domestic support for transparency reforms. In this 
regard, accountability forums such as media and parliamentary oversight 
are crucial to establish the will of people. The lack of strong national-level 
accountability forums in Turkey confirms their importance in bringing 
international tax transparency up the agenda.
117. Anka Haber, Bakan	 Agbal	 Panama	 Sorusuna	 Yanit	 Verdi	 (18 June 2016), online: <www.
ankahaber.com.tr/politika/bakan-agbal-panama-sorusuna-yanit-verdi-h23439.html> [perma.cc/3T7F-
ZYEB].
118. The leader of main opposition party revealed SWIFT documents leaked from a national bank that 
showed people close to the President of Turkey had sent millions of dollars to an off-shore company 
in the tax haven Isle of Man in 2011 and 2012.
119. TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 26. Donem 56:3 (29 November 2007) 181-194.
120. See OECD Peer Review 2003, supra note 40 (“[R]ecommendations resulting from [peer] review 
can…help governments win support at home for difficult measures”). 
